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Abstracts The effects of the minimum wage policy have been controversial 
in Korea with an increasing gap between the rich and the poor 
since the Asian financial crisis. Most studies in Korea have 
focused on the disemployment effects of higher minimum wages 
and the negative effects of the policy in Korea. This study looks 
at the possible effects of the minimum wage policy on reducing 
poverty rates, as measured by the number of people who fall 
under the defined poverty threshold. We utilize a binary probit 
model to analyze the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study data 
and find that a higher hourly minimum wage can reduce the 
probability of an individual falling under the poverty line.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
As is reviewed by Kennan (1995), the effects of minimum wages 
are multilateral and elusive. Most previous empirical studies on the 
  * The authors are members of ‘Brain Korea 21’ Research Group of Yonsei 
University. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of 
Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2053586).
 ** Department of Economics, Washington University, e-mail: rojiwon@gmail.com
*** Corresponding Author, Professor, School of Economics, Yonsei University, 
e-mail: jinook@yonsei.ac.kr
84  Jiwon Seo․Jinook Jeong
minimum wage policy have focused on its negative effects such as 
the reduction of employment opportunities for young adults or the 
reduction of employment benefits and cost of training workers. In 
fact, in the United States, it has been shown that high school dropout 
rates have increased as a result of a minimum wage hike.1) These 
studies have continued since the 1980s and more recent studies 
utilizing panel data have corroborated such previous results.
In 2011, the Minimum wage Council of Korea raised the minimum 
wage by 5.1 percent to 4,320 won (about $3.9) per hour. Past studies 
indicate that raising minimum wages may in fact result in employers 
reducing their labor force, either downgrading minimum wage 
earners to the informal sector or just forcing them to unemployment.
There have been many studies on the disemployment effects of 
raising the minimum wage level in Korea. However, not much 
evidence is shown to prove the poverty alleviating effects of the 
policy. With a rising “working poor” class, there are greater 
implications for policies like the minimum wage law. Immediately 
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea’s poor class expanded to 
include many irregular workers and those in private businesses. 
Therefore we attempt to analyze the effects of the minimum wage 
policy on poverty in Korea and focus on whether it can reduce the 
probability of an individual lying under the poverty line.
Ⅱ. Survey of the Literature
The effects of minimum wage policies have been primarily 
explained by economic theories based on the Harris-Todaro model. A 
minimum wage hike in the formal sector will reduce the labor force 
and push the unskilled laborers into the informal market. With a 
 1) Anderson and Rawe (2009).
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larger labor supply in the informal market, wages will fall. On the 
other hand, since expected wages in the formal sector are higher, 
workers laid off by the raise in the minimum wage have an incentive 
to stay in the formal sector and search for a different job. It also 
provides workers in the informal sector with incentives to enter the 
formal sector. As a result, unemployment in the formal sector may 
rise. Therefore, the overall impact of a minimum wage increase is 
ambiguous. According to Addison and Blackburn (1999), “while some 
workers gain, others lose, with the benefits of the minimum wage 
not being spread out evenly across low-income workers.”
The effects of the minimum wage on the distribution of family 
incomes are also uncertain for similar reasons that a minimum wage 
hike produces both losers and gainers. In fact, the problem becomes 
more complicated when we want to analyze the effects of raising the 
minimum wage on family income distribution as opposed to 
earnings because other unpredictable factors come into play, as 
Addison and Blackburn (1999) suggest. For example, with a rise or 
fall in family earnings due to the effects of the wage hike, other 
members of the family not affected by the minimum wage may 
choose to change their work status, by either leaving their jobs or 
finding one, depending on whether the member was previously 
working or not working, respectively.
In the United States, dozens of simulation studies have been done 
in the 1990’s on the effects of this policy, both including and 
disregarding disemployment effects. Most of them have suggested 
that minimum wages do reduce poverty. One of the first actual 
empirical studies done on this topic was by Card and Krueger (1995). 
They did regression analyses with state level data and concluded that 
there is “a modest poverty-reducing effect of the minimum wage” 
(Card and Krueger). They also claimed that if the demand for labor 
in the formal sector is inelastic, wages in both sectors will actually 
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rise. Addison and Blackburn (1999) particularly focused their analysis 
on three groups of workers most likely to be low-wage workers: 
teenagers (age 16 to 19), young adults (age 20 to 24) and junior-high 
dropouts. They found that a 25 percent increase in the minimum 
wage lowers the poverty rate of workers in the three groups by 9%.
Despite the positive implications of early studies, there remained a 
lot of skepticism with regards to the poverty alleviating effects of 
higher minimum wages. For instance, in most developed countries, 
minimum wage earners are teenagers, as is the dominant case in the 
United States. It has been shown that they tend to be children of 
high-income families and not members of poor households. As a 
result, raising the minimum wage only increases total income of 
high-income households and does little to redistribute income across 
households. In addition, it is difficult to enforce minimum wage laws 
in the informal sector. However, in developing countries, most of the 
lowest-income workers tend to either work in the unregulated and 
informal sectors or engage in private family business, and in effect 
receiving none of the benefits of a higher minimum wage.
Neumark and Wascher (2002) did a more rigorous empirical study 
that captured both the disemployment effect and the income effect of 
the minimum wage hike. They showed that over a one-to-two-year 
period, raising the minimum wage increases the probability of poor 
families escaping poverty. However, the study also showed that the 
probability of non-poor families falling into poverty increases as 
families that were initially not poor began to receive lesser wages. 
Nevertheless, they found that the incomes of families that remain 
below the poverty line do rise from raising the minimum wage level.
Additionally, other studies look at the different effects the 
minimum wage has on developed and developing countries. The 
“World Development Report” of 1995 provides evidence that the 
minimum wage policy is ineffective in low-income countries because 
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both employers and employees are likely to either ignore or be 
unaware of the minimum wage law. However, studies on South 
America in recent years including Lustig and McLeod (1996) showed 
that in certain areas of South America and Asia, higher minimum 
wages have a significant negative correlation with poverty rates; an 
increase or decrease in the minimum wage reduces or increases the 
poverty rate, respectively. Although minimum wage policies could 
reduce efficiency and competitiveness especially in low income 
countries, and as Lustig and McLeod (1996) have shown, raise 
unemployment by increasing the minimum wage, the overall 
conclusion is that in the short run, higher minimum wages do help 
the poor. Morely (1995) and Gindling and Terrell (2008) have also 
made similar conclusions through data analysis. These results 
contrast with earlier studies in developed countries such as the 
United States that proved that wage hikes have been ineffective in 
protecting the poor class.
In Korea, studies reflecting on the effectiveness of the minimum 
wage have only begun to emerge recently, with most of them 
focusing on the disemployment effects. One of the first empirical 
studies done by Kim and Kim (2004) analyzes data from 1988-2004 
and concludes that raising the minimum wage in Korea has had a 
positive effect for the following groups of people: age 24-54, age 54 
years and older, and women. Similar results have been shown with 
different data. Lee et al. (2008) use panel data analysis to show that 
the minimum wage has a negative employment effect for teenagers 
and old-age workers while it has a positive effect on prime-age 
workers (age 25-54). 
There are very few studies that address the poverty-alleviating 
effects of the minimum wage in Korea. Most of them are simple data 
analysis or simulation analysis and they conclude that the poverty- 
reduction effects are modest because the level of the minimum wage 
88  Jiwon Seo․Jinook Jeong
is too low to affect low-income workers, and there are still too many 
low-paying jobs that ignore the minimum wage law. However, Lee 
(2009) shows that with a higher level of the minimum wage and 
eligible-recipients-to-total-worker ratio, and a smaller disemployment 
effect, poverty rates can be lowered.
Ⅲ. Minimum Wages and Poverty in Korea
The issue of rising poverty rates began to surface in Korea after 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 when major structural reforms were 
implemented. People were laid off in massive scales after which 
more than 57 percent of laborers became ‘non-regular’ or low income 
workers.2) With the unexpected rise in the low income workers, the 
government began to reinstate and enforce a more effective 
minimum wage policy.
Although Korea passed the minimum wage law in 1986, it went 
into effect in 1988. In the beginning, the law applied only to workers 
in designated industries of certain sizes. In 2001, the law was 
expanded to include all workers in all industries. Figure 1 shows the 
growth rate of minimum wages in comparison to the growth rate of 
the nominal GDP from 1989 to 2010. Although the growth rate of the 
minimum wage in 1989 was 29.7%, it gradually decreased through 
the 1990’s, reaching 2.7% in 1999. In fact, there are many years in 
which the rate of minimum wage increase falls short of the GDP 
growth rate. Additionally, even though the growth rate of the 
minimum wage has been rising in the 2000’s, the highest rate spikes 
were in 2001 and 2005 of 16.6% and 13.1% respectively.
 2) ‘Non-regular’ workers refer to the workers on a short-term contract (usually 
yearly contract), while ‘regular’ workers are on a longer-term or permanent 
contract. Although non-regular workers are full-time workers, their job 
security is much more vulnerable than regular workers.
The Effects of the Minimum Wage on Poverty in Korea  89
【Figure 1】Growth Rate of Minimum Wages and GDP (%), 1989-2010
Korea’s minimum wage falls short of the minimum cost of living 
that is calculated and readjusted every year by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare. The index was first introduced in 1999 in order to serve 
as the basis for social welfare policies and subsidies and has been 
released every year in August. In Korea, a national survey of the 
living standard of the general public is taken every three years and 
the index is calculated on a market basket basis. Approximately 
20,000 households in 481 regions are included and the index is 
produced by the price levels of goods included in the "basket" that 
are considered the absolute necessities of livelihood and they are 
weighted by the degree of use. In the two years in which the survey 
is not taken, the index is estimated through the increase rate of the 
consumer price index. 
The minimum living expenses are categorized into six different 
levels, each representing the bare minimum needed per household 
with one to six members. We present, in Figure 2, only four of the 
six levels as compared with the minimum wage that is converted 
into a monthly figure. Although the monthly minimum wage is 
higher than the minimum living expenses for a household of 1 
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person, it falls short of the amount that is needed for households of 
2 or more people.
【Figure 2】Monthly Minimum Wage and Minimum Living Expenses
Note: 1,000 Korean Won, 2000-2011.
Ⅳ. Methodology and Data
We use the Korean Labor & Income Panel Study (KLIPS) that is 
annually released by the Korea Labor Institute (KLI). It is an overall 
survey of the labor market and the income situation of 5,000 
households and individuals in Korea. It is the first domestic panel 
study on the labor market and the only longitudinal survey 
conducted on the national level. Data have been released since 1998 
with11years’ worth of data up to 2009. However, because data for 
annual income is not consistent across the board, we have decided to 
analyze only data from year 6 (2003) to year 11 (2008).
Our objective is to analyze the effects of the minimum wage policy 
on “the poor”, as is defined by the official minimum cost of living, 
and to estimate the effects of a minimum wage increase on the 
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probability that an individual will be able to escape from poverty. 
We employ the following panel probit regression:3)
      ′       (1)
The variable   indicates whether individual   at time  is 
poor or not. It takes on a value of 1 if the individual’s annual 
income is less than the minimum cost of living, considered to be 
“poor”, and a value of 0 otherwise.   is the official hourly 
minimum wage that is annually announced by the Minimum Wage 
Council. 
Although there is no official poverty line in Korea, “absolute 
poverty” is usually referred to those living under the level of the 
minimum cost of living made official by the government every year. 
In our study, we categorize those earning less than the minimum 
cost of living for a household of 1,2,3, and 4 as poor (  ) 
and those that earn above as non-poor (  ) for each year.
  contains a set of individual specific variables including age, 
age squared, years of schooling, years of schooling squared, and 
weekly working hours, in addition to dummy variables that specify 
location of residence, sex, health condition. Additionally,   is a 
macro-level covariate, e.g., growth rate of real GDP included to 
control for the economic climate. We use an individual random 
effects probit model to estimate the probability of being poor with 
respect to the change in minimum wages. 
 3) The model is similar to the one used by Gindling and Terrell (2008).
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【Table 1】Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Description Mean(All Surveyed)
Mean
(Workers Only)
Age 44.99(0.0856)
41.12
(0.1225)
Age-squared 2153.63(8.2028)
1788.77
(10.7534)
Sex 1-Male, 0-Female 0.71(0.0034)
0.71
(0.0056)
Education Years of schooling 11.95
(0.0277)
12.53
(0.0406)
Education-
squared
156.37
(0.6240)
167.67
(0.9579)
Location4) 1-Urban, 0-Non urban 0.52(0.0038)
0.56
(0.0062)
Weekly Working 
Hours
49.10
(0.1342)
48.64
(0.1551)
Working 1-Currently working, 0-Otherwise
0.97
(0.0012) -
Health Condition 1-Excellent/Good, 0-Poor 0.61(0.0037)
0.67
(0.0058)
ln (Minimum 
wage)
Log of real minimum wage 7.92
(0.0010)
7.92
(0.0010)
GDP growth Growth rate of real GDP (%)
4.2
(0.0081)
4.2
(0.0081)
Full-time 1-Full time, 0-Part time - 0.97(0.0019)
Regular work 1-Regular, 0-Irregular job - 0.82(0.0047)
Work status 1-Consistently working, 0-Temporary job/Daily worker -
0.89
(0.0039)
Job type 1-Private company, 0-Public/Government related -
0.89
(0.0039)
Size of 
workplace5)
1-Large and Mid-sized firm, 
0-Small business
- 0.55
(0.0062)
P1 1-Poor, 0-Non poor
0.05
(0.0016)
0.01
(0.0015)
P2 1-Poor, 0-Non poor 0.13(0.0025)
0.07
(0.0031)
P3 1-Poor, 0-Non poor 0.21(0.0031)
0.15
(0.0044)
P4 1-Poor, 0-Non poor 0.31(0.0035)
0.24
(0.0053)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 4) Urban includes the seven major cities of Korea: Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, 
Incheon, Gwangju, and Ulsan. All other areas were classified as non urban.
 5) Companies with 50 or fewer employees are considered small businesses. This 
simplified classification is based on that as defined by the Minor Enterprise 
Basic Law of Korea.
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Table 1 shows the sample means and standard deviations of the 
variables for the entire sample and for the workers sample. We find 
that in our analysis, the average age is 45, there are more men in the 
sample, the average number of years of schooling is 12, and the 
proportion of urban-to-rural dwellers is nearly equal. Also, most of 
the population is currently working with an average weekly working 
hour of 49. The average age of the ‘workers only’ sample is slightly 
lower at 41 and the weekly working hours are slightly less. Most 
workers are full-time, regular workers, while the ratio of large-to- 
small firm workers is approximately 1:1.
【Table 1-1】Descriptive statistics by year
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Age 42.49 43.49 44.49 45.49 46.48 47.49
Age-squared 1932.22 2018.2 2106.22 2195.88 2287.43 2381.47
Sex 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Education 11.992 11.97 11.98 12.01 11.90 11.92
Education-squared 156.20 156.10 156.71 157.50 155.50 156.20
Location 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51
Weekly Working 
Hours 51.02 50.95 49.07 48.75 48.52 46.29
Working 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.94
Health Condition 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.62
ln (real MW) 7.73 7.79 7.89 7.95 8.05 8.09
GDP growth 2.9 4.9 3.9 5.2 5.5 2.8
P1 0.0560 0.0462 0.0533 0.0513 0.0451 0.0519
P2 0.1215 0.1212 0.1222 0.1300 0.1273 0.1310
P3 0.2074 0.2155 0.2135 0.2077 0.1952 0.2430
P4 0.3112 0.3248 0.3174 0.3007 0.2936 0.2994
Ⅴ. Empirical Results
Our first analysis included data of 2,946 individuals over the six 
year period between 2003 and 2008. Table 2 summarizes the results 
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of our analysis for the effects of a rise in the minimum wage under 
different poverty thresholds: P1, P2, P3, and P4. Each defines the 
poverty threshold by the monthly minimum cost of living for 
families of one, two, three, and four members, respectively, in a 
given year.
The estimated coefficients of  , which is the variable of 
interest, is negative and statistically significant.  Therefore, a rise in 
the minimum wage will decrease the probability that someone will 
be under the poverty threshold. This result is consistent with many 
of the previous studies done in other developing countries and is 
especially meaningful for the Korean case because it has faced 
criticism in recent years for its ineffectiveness. Although the 
minimum wage policy has contributed to the rise in wages for low 
income workers in the 1980s when it was first introduced, it has been 
negatively evaluated for not being effective in alleviating poverty and 
raising the living standards for low wage workers since the structural 
reforms of the labor market after the financial crisis in 1997.6) The 
results of this study show that the higher the minimum wage, the 
poverty population tends to decrease. The coefficients are negative 
through all four levels of poverty.
Age, sex, weekly working hours, and current health conditions are 
all significant at least the 90%confidence level. The coefficients of 
these variables are in line with previous studies done with Korean 
data. 
First, our results show that the older population tends to be 
non-poor. Although it is true that Korea boasts the highest elderly 
poverty rate, the data that we used did not include a large elderly 
population, with the average age of our data being 45, as can be seen 
in Table 2. Taking this into consideration, it falls in line with the 
results of previous U.S. studies that young adults who make up most 
 6) For example, Jeong (2006).
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of the labor market will also have the higher probability of falling 
into poverty. 
【Table 2】Estimated Coefficients of Binary Probit Model with Random 
Effects (All Surveyed)
P1 P2 P3 P4
Intercept 9.5830***(1.5358)
7.6692***
(1.1946)
8.3640***
(1.0889)
15.6508***
(1.0980)
Age -0.1851***(0.0182)
-0.2007***
(0.0172)
-0.2599***
(0.0185)
-0.2915***
(0.0204)
Age-squared
0.0022***
(0.0002)
0.0025***
(0.0002)
0.0032***
(0.0002)
0.0036***
(0.0002)
Sex -0.7429***(0.0795)
-1.0291***
(0.0724)
-1.4633***
(0.0771)
-1.7430***
(0.0858)
Education -0.0544(0.0336)
-0.0546
(0.0341)
-0.0486
(0.0372)
-0.0676
(0.0445)
Education-
squared
-0.0018
(0.0016)
-0.0031**
(0.0016)
-0.0050***
(0.0017)
-0.0064***
(0.0020)
Location -0.0343(0.0719)
-0.0422
(0.0639)
-0.0155
(0.0650)
-0.0552
(0.0683)
Weekly Working 
Hours
-0.0138***
(0.0017)
-0.0152***
(0.0014)
-0.0118***
(0.0013)
-0.0093***
(0.0013)
Working
0.3430***
(0.1319)
0.4237***
(0.1083)
0.4244***
(0.1059)
0.2303*
(0.1085)
Health Condition -0.0562(0.0562)
-0.1233***
(0.0431)
-0.1892***
(0.0394)
-0.1456***
(0.0383)
ln (MW) -0.8533***(0.1925)
-0.4937***
(0.1493)
-0.2839**
(0.1354)
-1.0115***
(0.1348)
GDP growth
-0.0369*
(0.0221)
0.0116
(0.0168)
-0.0646***
(0.0151)
0.0146
(0.0147)
Note: *** signifies significance at the 1% level; ** signifies significance at the 
5% level; and * signifies significance at the 10% level. Standard errors 
are indicated in parentheses.
Second, our variable for sex had a mean value of 0.71 indicating 
that more men were included in the study. We also show that men 
have a smaller probability than women of being poor. This is also 
consistent with the concept of ‘feminization of poverty’ which was 
introduced in the 1980s in the United States to explain the 
phenomenon of the majority of the poverty class being women. 
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Although the proportion of female workers in Korea has drastically 
increased in recent years, the labor market is still discriminatory 
against women in terms of wage inequality. In 2004, the average 
monthly wage of women was 63.15% that of men (Shin, 2007). 
Therefore, the economic status of women has not improved and has 
actually led more women to fall into poverty
Third, although statistically insignificant, we find that a person 
with more years of schooling will less likely fall into poverty. Higher 
education leads to better chances of receiving higher wages, 
improving one’s chances of becoming poor. We also show that with 
more weekly working hours and better health conditions, a person 
will more likely be above the poverty line. 
【Table 3】Marginal Effects of Binary Probit Model with Random Effects 
(All Surveyed)
P1 P2 P3 P4
Age -0.0016***(0.0003)
-0.0082***
(0.0010)
-0.0266***
(0.0024)
-0.0612***
(0.0049)
Age-squared 1.93e-05***
(0.0000)
0.0001***
(1.0e-05)
0.0003***
(3.0e-05)
0.0007***
(0.0001)
Sex -0.0112***(0.0023)
-0.0726***
(0.0085)
-0.2506***
(0.0193)
-0.4898***
(0.0271)
Education -0.0005(0.0003)
-0.0022
(0.0014)
-0.0050
(0.0039)
-0.0142
(0.0095)
Education-
squared
-1.54e-05
(1.0e-05)
-0.0001*
(0.0001)
-0.0005***
(0.0002)
-0.0013***
(0.0004)
Location -0.0003(0.0006)
-0.0017
(0.0026)
-0.0016
(0.0067)
-0.0116
(0.0144)
Weekly Working 
Hours
-0.0001***
(0.0000)
-0.0006***
(0.0001)
-0.0012***
(0.0002)
-0.0019***
(0.0175)
Working 0.0020***
(0.0006)
0.0115***
(0.0021)
0.0311***
(0.0056)
0.0425**
(0.0175)
Health Condition -0.0005(0.0005)
-0.0052***
(0.0020)
-0.0200***
(0.0045)
-0.0311***
(0.0085)
ln (real MW) -0.0075***(0.0022)
-0.0203***
(0.0064)
-0.0290**
(0.0139)
-0.2124***
(0.0294)
GDP growth -0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0005
(0.0007)
-0.0066***
(0.0016)
0.0031
(0.0031)
Note: *** signifies significance at the 1% level; ** signifies significance at the 
5% level; and * signifies significance at the 10% level. Standard errors 
are indicated in parentheses.
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As the estimated model is a binary regression, the value of the 
estimated coefficient does not directly reflect the marginal effect of 
the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. Table 3 shows 
the estimated marginal effects for a comparison.
We extricate workers from the entire sample population and 
include several factors that are exclusive to only workers: whether 
they work full time or part time, regular work or non-regular work, 
in a large-to-medium-sized firm or a small firm, and what their 
working status and type of work is. We find that the overall results 
are not so different from the previous results that include 
non-workers.7) We replicate the analysis, using the same model, for 
1,102 workers over the six year period with the same poverty 
thresholds for P1 through P4. The results are shown in Table 4 
below.
We note that the effects of a rise in the minimum wage are smaller 
for workers. We find that the minimum wage has a positive effect on 
the level of poverty and at a slightly smaller scale than that in the 
analysis that included both workers and non-workers. While a 10% 
increase of the minimum wage reduces the probability of a person in 
the labor force to be poor by 0.075 from Table 3, the coefficients from 
Table 4 indicate that the same impact will reduce the probability for 
workers to be poor by 0.023. 
Age and sex move in the opposite direction of the poverty rate, as 
was the case with workers and non-workers, and education remains 
an insignificant variable in the analysis. The new variables that were 
introduced into our second analysis produced the following results: 
full time and regular workers tend to have a lower probability of 
falling into poverty as opposed to part time and non-regular 
 7) Whether to work or not could be an endogenous decision, if the probability 
of working is influenced by being poor. If it is, the estimation of workers data 
may suffer from the selectivity bias. With such a possibility in mind, we 
present the results for comparison purpose.
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【Table 4】Estimated Results of the Random Effects Binary Probit 
Model (Workers Only)
P1 P2 P3 P4
Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect
Intercept 25.4258***
(4.5977) -
18.7764***
(2.7194) -
22.5946***
(2.3803) -
26.8838***
(2.2625) -
Age -0.1239***(0.0425)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.2410***
(0.0378)
-0.0013***
(0.0005)
-0.3182***
(0.0408)
-0.0057***
(0.0016)
-0.3301***
(0.0416)
-0.0241***
(0.0045)
Age-
squared
0.0013***
(0.0005)
1.04e-06
(0.0000)
0.0031***
(0.0004)
1.61e-05***
(1.0e-05)
0.0041***
(0.0005)
0.0001***
(2.0e-05)
0.0041***
(0.0005)
0.0003***
(0.0001)
Sex -0.6137***(0.1770)
-0.0009
(0.0007)
-1.1295***
(0.1482)
-0.0154***
(0.0051)
-1.9612***
(0.1684)
-0.1336***
(0.0248)
-2.3032***
(0.1635)
-0.4074***
(0.0446)
Education -0.0437(0.0932)
-3.46e-05
(0.0001)
-0.0926
(0.0802)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
-0.2332**
(0.0962)
-0.0042*
(0.0022)
-0.2598**
(0.1039)
-0.0190**
(0.0084)
Education-
squared
-0.0002
(0.0041)
-1.34e-07
(0.0000)
-0.0005
(0.0037)
-2.47e-06
(2.0e-05)
0.0024
(0.0042)
4.31e-05
(0.0001)
0.0008
(0.0045)
0.0001
(0.0003)
Location 0.1934(0.1626)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.2916**
(0.1323)
0.0015*
(0.0009)
0.1509
(0.1364)
0.0027
(0.0025)
0.0604
(0.1289)
0.0044
(0.0093)
Weekly 
Working 
Hours
-0.0131***
(0.0051)
-1.03e-05
(1.0e-05)
-0.0116***
(0.0036)
-0.0001**
(3.0e-05)
-0.0036
(0.0032)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0043
(0.0031)
0.0003
(0.0002)
Full-time -0.7787***(0.2384)
-0.0026
(0.0028)
-0.6169***
(0.2136)
-0.0081
(0.0063)
-0.4348**
(0.2182)
-0.0133
(0.0112)
-0.6818***
(0.2625)
-0.0878
(0.0536)
Regular -0.6498***(0.2030)
-0.0012
(0.0011)
-0.5405***
(0.1296)
-0.0051*
(0.0027)
-0.3889***
(0.1225)
-0.0098*
(0.0051)
-0.4221***
(0.1197)
-0.0398
(0.0155)
Health 
condition
-0.0188
(0.1417)
-1.51e-05
(0.0001)
-0.1258
(0.0904)
-0.0007
(0.0006)
-0.1826***
(0.0782)
-0.0036*
(0.0019)
-0.0900
(0.0737)
-0.0068
(0.0059)
Work 
Status
-0.1944
(0.2141)
-0.0002
(0.0003)
-0.1856
(0.1557)
-0.0012
(0.0014)
-0.2209
(0.1556)
-0.0049
(0.0045)
-0.2916*
(0.1557)
-0.0262
(0.0174)
Job type 0.0254(0.2518)
1.94e-05
(0.0002)
0.2648
(0.1933)
0.0011
(0.0007)
0.2078
(0.1721)
0.0031
(0.0023)
0.2343
(0.1607)
0.0145*
(0.0088)
Size of 
Workplace
-0.2693*
(0.1504)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.2675**
(0.1058)
-0.0015*
(0.0009)
-0.2853***
(0.0305)
-0.0054**
(0.0025)
-0.6537***
(0.0936)
-0.0525***
(0.0113)
ln (MW) -2.8418***(0.5793)
-0.0023
(0.0019)
-1.7094***
(0.3367)
-0.0090**
(0.0039)
-1.7612***
(0.2869)
-0.0318***
(0.0099)
-2.0927***
(0.2699)
-0.1527***
(0.0301)
GDP 
Growth
-0.1345**
(0.0634)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0259
(0.0370)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0707**
(0.0305)
-0.0013*
(0.0007)
0.0109
(0.0282)
0.0008
(0.0021)
Note: *** signifies significance at the 1% level; ** signifies significance at the 
5% level; and * signifies significance at the 10% level. Standard errors 
are indicated in parentheses.
workers, respectively. Although full time workers can also receive 
low wages, their work tends to be more stable and their total work 
hours tend to far exceed that of part time workers. Also, non-regular 
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workers normally receive lower wages and do not get any of the 
employment benefits that are reserved for regular workers. 
The size variable controls for the differences in the size of the firm 
in which the workers work by categorizing the workplace according 
to the number of employees: a large-to-medium sized firm of 50 or 
more workers and a small sized firm of less than 50 workers. This 
variable becomes more and more significant as the poverty threshold 
is raised and the estimated coefficient indicates that the larger the 
firm, the less likely the worker will be under the poverty line. 
Ⅵ. Conclusion
The economics of the minimum wage policy has been a 
controversial question internationally since its inception. In Korea, the 
issue has received the spotlight with the rise of the poor population 
and the increasing gap between the rich and the poor since the Asian 
financial crisis. Even though there are a lot of studies already done 
on the effects of the policy, there have been difficulties in coming to 
an agreement about the orientation of that effect.
Most studies in Korea have focused on the disemployment effects 
of higher minimum wages, arguing that income tends to fall in the 
informal sector because workers are laid off in the formal sector 
increasing the flow of labor into the informal sector. They claim that 
those who actually are in need of the benefits of the policy could end 
up receiving lower wages. As such, the studies so far have focused 
on the negative effects of the policy in Korea. 
This study looks at the possible effects of the minimum wage 
policy on reducing poverty rates, as measured by the number of 
people who fall under the defined poverty threshold. We utilize the 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study data to analyze this effect and 
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find that older generations, the more educated, and men tend to be 
less poor than their counterparts while those with poor health 
conditions and less weekly working hours tend to be poor. When we 
analyze the data of workers only we find that full time and regular 
workers tend to be above the poverty line while those working in 
large-to-medium sized firms tend to not fall into poverty as easily as 
those who work in small firms. However, most importantly, we find 
that under both cases (of the entire sample population and of only 
workers) the higher the hourly minimum wage, the smaller the 
probability of falling under the poverty line. This result is 
contradictory to the results of many studies done in developed 
countries where there is usually a negative effect or only a very 
modest positive effect while it is consistent with those done in 
developing countries. The results of our analysis show that the 
minimum wage policy can indeed be used as an effective policy to 
target the alleviation of poverty and decrease the poverty rate in 
Korea.
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최저임금제가 빈곤에 미치는 영향
서 지 원*․정 진 욱**
8)
논문초록  
아시아 외환위기 이후 한국의 빈부 격차가 심해지면서, 최저임금제도의 효
과와 관련한 연구가 많이 이루어졌다. 대부분의 연구는 최저임금제의 부정적 
효과인 실업의 발생에 집중되었다. 이 연구는 최저임금제가 빈곤층을 줄이는 
효과가 있는지를 분석한다. 2003-2008 기간의 한국노동연구원 패널자료
(KLIPS)를 임의효과 패널 프로빗 모형으로 추정한 결과, 한국의 최저임금제
는 빈곤층이 될 확률을 낮추는 효과가 있었던 것으로 실증되었다.
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